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Abstract
In this paper we analyse old-age retirement decisions of Slovenian men and women eligible
to retire in the period 1997-2003. In comparison to established market economies, we ￿nd
relatively high hazard rates of retirement that decline with age. This peculiar pattern can
be partly attributed to weak incentives to work inherent in the design of Social Security, and
is re￿ ected in predominantly negative values of accruals, and to transition-speci￿c increase
in wage inequality in the late 1980s and early 1990s. This is re￿ ected in low wages and
relatively high pensions of less productive (skilled) workers and vice versa. We also ￿nd that
the probability of retirement increases with social security wealth and decreases with net
wages, although the response to option value to work, when controlling for wage di⁄erences,
is rather weak. Our results also imply that less educated persons, persons with greater
private wealth, and persons entitled to severance payment are more likely to retire.
Keywords: retirement, option value, social security wealth, transition
JEL Classi￿cation Numbers: J26
1 Introduction
This paper provides an empirical analysis of old-age retirement decisions of Slovenian men and
women. The key question we address here is how the design of the Social Security system
regarding the determination of pensions a⁄ected the aggregate ￿ ows from employment to re-
tirement.1 For this purpose we use individual-level data for a sample of employed Slovenian
workers who were eligible to retire with old-age pension in the period 1997-2003.
￿We are grateful to the Slovenian Statistical O¢ ce for providing access to the data in a safe room.
yFaculty of Economics, University of Ljubljana, Kardeljeva pl. 17, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia. E-mail:
ales.ahcan@ef.uni-lj.si.
zFaculty of Economics, University of Ljubljana, Kardeljeva pl. 17, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia and Institute for
Economic Research, Ljubljana. E-mail: saso.polanec@ef.uni-lj.si.
1It is important to note that Slovenia is a country with the lowest employment rates of older persons in
EU-27. According to Eurostat (2006), in 2005 the employment rates of Slovenian men and women aged 55-64
were only 44.5 and 21.0 percent, respectively, which is 8.1 and 13.8 percentage points below the EU-27 averages.
1In the ￿rst part of the empirical analysis, we document the distributions of incentive mea-
sures that re￿ ect the rules of the Social Security and labor market performance. Based on a
calculation of accruals, we ￿nd that the rules on pension determination provide rather weak
incentives to work in Slovenia. For the majority of persons in our sample additional year of
work decreases the expected stream of pensions (social security wealth), and for persons with
positive value of accrual, these are relatively low.2 At the same time low values of accrual imply
that the pension reform adopted in 1999, which increased the responsiveness of pensions to
lifetime incomes and insurance spans, brought modest improvements to incentives to work.
The decision to retire is, however, not driven entirely by the Social Security incentives. Stock
and Wise (1990) show that a rational individual should base her/his decision on the option value
to work, which captures the combined e⁄ects of incentives inherent in the design of the Social
Security and labor market performance. We calculated the option values for our sample and
found positive values for the majority of men and women. This result suggests that incentives
for work stem mainly from discrepancy between wages and pensions and not from the design
of the Social Security. The data also reveal that the option value increases with age, implying
that younger workers eligible to retire face weaker incentives to work. This ￿nding is tightly
related to an observed increase in the wage inequality and skill premia in Slovenia in the late
1980s and early 1990s (Orazem and Vodopivec, 1995, 1997). Namely, the option values of less
educated workers, who tend to start working at an early age and who are therefore eligible to
retire at lower age, are low because they faced a decrease in real wages and at the same time
retained a right to relatively high pensions due to a history of high wages.
In the second part of analysis we model the retirement decisions of Slovenian workers that
were eligible to retire. We ￿nd that the option value to work, a key explanatory variable in the
model, has a negative and statistically signi￿cant e⁄ect on retirement for both samples of men
and women. This implies that workers with higher option value are more likely to continue
working. However, Coile and Gruber (2001) argue that the variation of wages accounts for
a large part of variation in the option value across individuals and if wage di⁄erences capture
partly heterogeneity in tastes for work, then building wage variation into the retirement incentive
measure can lead to biased estimates of responsiveness of retirement to option value. For this
reason, we also estimate the e⁄ect of option value on retirement when entered simultaneously
An important reason for low employment rates are large out￿ ows of workers to retirement. In a short period
between 1990 and 1995, the number of persons that retired with old-age pensions increased by as much as 31.4
percent and by the end of 2005 their number further increased by 21.5 percent, raising the share of retirees in
population to 26.7 percent (Eurostat, 2006).
2While the peak value was shown to be more appropriate measure of Social Security incentives (Coile and
Gruber, 2001), the distinction between the two is not important in our sample of persons due to high correlation
between the two measures. This is to be expected given the de￿nition of these two variables and features of the
rules on pension determination in Slovenia.
2with net wage and ￿nd no e⁄ect of option value on retirement decisions for men and weaker
negative e⁄ect for women. An absence of explanatory power of option value alone con￿rms that
Social Security alone provides weak or no incentives to work.
Our empirical model also features additional variables that were used in previous empirical
analyses (e.g. Coile and Gruber, 2001; Gruber and Wise, 2004; Berkel and Borsch-Supan, 2004).
We ￿nd that skilled persons are less likely to retire, which suggests that better educated workers
tend to perform jobs with lower disutility of work. Next, we ￿nd that private wealth, proxied
by dummies for land and appartment ownership, increases the likelihood of retirement. At the
same time we do not ￿nd a statistically signi￿cant e⁄ect of capital income (rents and dividends)
to be important drivers of early retirement. We also consider the impact of severance payment
on retirement decision. This is an interesting variable to study as it is not independent from
the decision and timing of retirement. The severance payments in Slovenia were often used as
an incentive mechanism to induce earlier retirement by employers who could not dismiss older
workers. Also, since a severance payment paid today is more valuable than tommorrow due to
time value of money, we are not surprised to ￿nd positive e⁄ect of severance payment on the
likelihood of retirement.
Our work contributes to the extensive literature on retirement behavior. This is the ￿rst
study to document the measures of Social Security incentives that relate these to retirement
decisions for a transition country. While several researchers have already noted that social safety
nets in Central and Eastern European countries have induced workers to inactivity (e.g. Boeri,
2000), data limitations have prevented analysis of individual retirement decisions. Slovenia is
an example of a country that not only o⁄ers weak incentives for continued work, similarly to
other established market economies (see Wise and Gruber, 2004), but also exhibits particular
wage dynamics. Due to a large output decline related to price liberalization (Gomulka, 1992;
and Kornai, 1994; Blanchard and Kremer, 1997; Roland and Verdier, 1999) and aggregate
demand shocks (Blanchard and Berg, 1994; Rosati, 1994), transition countries faced a decline
in labor demand and consequently a reduction in real wages relative to pensions. At the same
time wage inequality surged in all transition countries (see e.g. Milanovic, 1999; Newell, 2001;
Mitra and Yemtsov, 2006), an important part of which was attributed to increasing returns to
education (see Orazem and Vodopivec, 1995, 1997; Newell and Reilly, 1999; Micklewright, 2000;
Kattuman and Redmont, 2001; Campos and Jolli⁄e, 2003). These shifts in wages, combined
with early retirement policies, provided weaker incentives for continued work for the majority of
less educated workers, which are today re￿ ected in the lowest employment rates of older workers
in transition countries.
3The rest of the paper is organized in the following way. In Section 2 we give an overview
of eligibility and pension determination rules in Slovenia. In Section 3, we describe the data
and discuss the limitations we face in calculation of forward looking variables. In Section 4 we
describe the methodology, estimation method and the results. Section 5 summarizes the key
￿ndings and concludes.
2 Eligibility and pension determination rules in Slovenia
In this section we provide a brief overview of the retirement eligibility rules and determination
of pensions of the Slovenian Social Security system.
Eligibility rules
The eligibility rules for retirement in Slovenia were changing throughout the transition period
with two reforms taking place in 1992 and 1999. In spite of parametric changes, the system
preserved its key structural feature: multiple pathways to retirement. A person could retire
to receive an old-age pension if she or he ful￿lled one of the three sets of normal statutory
conditions. Until 2000 the following sets of conditions, adopted in 1992, applied. First, men
(women) could retire at 58 (53) years of age and 40 (35) years of total insurance period.3 These
conditions targeted the largest group of workers with either primary or secondary education
who started to work between 15 and 19 years of age. The second set of conditions allowed men
and women to retire at 63 (58) years of age and 20 years of total insurance period, while the
third set of conditions allowed men and women to retire at 65 (63) years of age and 15 years
of paid insurance period. The latter sets of conditions targeted high-skilled workers who spent
at least some time in tertiary education and low-skilled workers with lengthier unemployment
spells.
These rules were not fully applicable until January 1998. For example, the minimum age
under the ￿rst set of conditions was 57.5 (52.5) years for men (women) in 1997. However,
if a person retired due to bankruptcy of a ￿rm or a job performed by a person was deemed
technologically obsolete by an employer, the minimum age and insurance period could be further
reduced. Hence, prior to 2000 many men (women) retired with full bene￿ts at the age 55 (50)
years of age and with 35 (30) years of total insurance period.4
3The Slovenian pension system distinguishes between a paid insurance period and a total insurance period.
The paid insurance period is a sum of the total time that a person worked full time (and paid Social Security
contributions) and the added time for the purchased insurance period (for the time of enrollement in tertiary
education and for the time spent serving the army). The total insurance period is a sum of paid insurance period
and special added period for the time army service during the World War II.
4We exclude from analysis all persons that retired under special legislation (workers with asbestos, workers in
riskier professions, judges, MPs, police). These persons could retire at lower age and with lower total insurance
4The 1999 reform brought many changes that led to an increase in the e⁄ective retirement
age. Among the key changes was the abolition of many special provisions that allowed early
retirement. While the standard eligibility conditions for old-age retirement of men remained
unchanged, the new reform imposed stricter conditions for women. The ￿rst set of conditions
allowed women to retire at 58 years of age and 38 years of total insurance period. The second
set of conditions imposes the minimum age to 61 years and the minimum total insurance period
to 20 years, whereas the last set of conditions allowed women to retire at 63 years of age and 15
years of paid insurance period. These eligibility rules were, however, introduced gradually, not
fully enacted until 2014. During the transition period the statutory retirement age increases
stepwise. The statutory age increases by 4 months for each elapsed year from 1999 onwards,
whereas the minimum insurance period increases by 3 months for each elapsed year from 2001
onwards. For example, in 2000 women could retire either with 53 years and 4 months of age
and 35 years of insurance or with 58 years and 4 months of age and 20 years of insurance or
with 60 years and 4 months of age and 15 years of paid insurance, etc.5
Determination of pensions
The pensions that old-age retirees receive from the Retirement and Invalidity Insurance Fund
(RIIF) are determined in two steps. In the ￿rst step the Average Indexed Monthly Earnings
for 120 + n consecutive months with the highest earnings is calculated:
AIMEmax =
1
120 + n
120+n X
k=1
(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ W
gross
k ￿ Ik; (1a)
where W
gross
k denotes the gross wage, ￿ is the average income tax rate6 and Ik is the national
wage index. While this formula applied both prior and after 1999, the last reform of pension
system extended the number of periods over which the AIMEmax was calculated. Until 2000
the number of years was limited to 10 and increased by 1 year until 2008, thereby decreasing
the AIMEmax of the majority of persons retiring after 2000.7
In the second step we relate the pension to the AIMEmax:
P = AIMEmax ￿ s ￿ (1 + x) ￿ v; (2)
period than required under the normal set of rules.
5Despite these changes some exceptions to these rules still remain. For example, the statutory age was reduced
for all persons that had one or more children or started Social Security insurance spell prior age 18.
6Although the marginal tax rates for personal income tax increase with level of income, the AIMEmax is
calculated using the average tax rate rather than the actual marginal tax rates.
7The maximum number of years over which AIME is calculated is 18 and applies from 2008 onwards.
5where s is the percentage share of AIMEmax that re￿ ects the length of paid insurance period,
x denotes the rewards and penalties related to longer or shorter insurance periods relative to
the statutory limits and v is an adjustment factor used to equalize the pensions of persons that
retired in di⁄erent time periods.8
The 1999 reform introduced additional changes to the determination of pensions. First,
until 2000 s was determined in the following way: for males with 15 years of paid insurance s
was 35 percent and increased by 2 percentage points for each additional year of paid insurance.
The percentage share for females was calculated di⁄erently: for 15 years of paid insurance s
was 40 percent and increased by 3 percentage points up to 20 years of paid insurance and by
2 percentage points for each additional year of paid insurance. From 2000 onwards s increased
with paid insurance at slower rate for both genders: 1.5 percentage points of the pension base
for each additional year above 15 years of insurance instead of 2 percentage points. For example,
prior the 1999 reform the male pension was set to 85 percent of AIMEmax for 40 years of total
insurance period and 72.5 percent after reform. Similarly, for women the pension was set to
85 percent for 38 years of paid insurance period prior reform and 72.5 percent after reform.
However, these reductions were introduced gradually. Each year prior to 2000 increased the
pension according to old rules and each year after 2000 contributes according to the new rules.
Hence, the full e⁄ects of the reform will not take place until 2024 for men and 2033 for women.
Second, until 2000 the continuation of work beyond 40 (35) years for men (women) of total
insurance was not rewarded. In fact, the percentage share of AIMEmax that a person could
receive was capped at 85 percent. The reform eliminated this cap, so that additional year of
work now increases the pension by at least 1.5 percentage points each year. In addition a system
of reduced bene￿ts and rewards (also referred to as a bonus-malus system), captured in x, for
retirement before and after the full retirement age and insurance period was set up. While prior
the 1999 reform modest penalties were in place, these were not always used and applied only
temporary reducing the pension by 1 percent for each missing year of insurance period. The
1999 reform further increased the pension (relative to AIMEmax) if a man (woman) continues to
work beyond 40 (38) years of total insurance period and/or if a man (woman) remains employed
beyond 63 (61) years of age. In both cases an increase in pension is capped: extended insurance
period can increase pension by utmost 3.6 percent of AIMEmax , whereas work beyond statutory
age can increase pension by as much as 7.2 percent. Besides rewards a system of reduced bene￿ts
or penalties was introduced. For all men that retire prior to age 63 without 40 years of insurance
8This term is called valorization factor and was introduced in order to adjust pensions of persons that retired
in di⁄erent time periods due to incomplete indexation of pensions during the early 1990s. During this period
pensions decreased by 15.1 percent in real terms.
6coverage, the pension is reduced. The reduction is age dependent, capped to a maximum 11.8
percent of calculated pensions. Before 2005 the calculated pensions adjusted according to a
complicated formula proportionaly to increases in a weighted average of CPI and average wage,
while after 2005 the adjustment was proportional only to increases in the average wage after
retirement.
In addition to pension, retirees in Slovenia are entitled to various transfers paid by the RIIF.
These are paid to persons with pensions below the lowest AIMEmax speci￿ed by legislation
(social safety transfer), and to persons unable to satisfy essential needs (transfer for domestic
practical aid). The retirees could also receive transfers for recreation, for voluntary insurance
contributions and annual contributions to compensate for rising cost of living.
3 The data
Data sources
For the purpose of econometric modeling of retirement decisions of Slovenian men and women,
we constructed a panel data set by merging data from three sources. First, the RIIF provided us
with information on the actual monthly and annual pensions and other bene￿ts, the retirement
date and the type of pension (old-age, family and disability) for each person that retired in the
period 1996-2005. They also provided information on special conditions under which each person
retired (e.g. workers employed in jobs that were technologically obsolete, police o¢ ciers and
other professionals with shorter required work span, World War II veterans, etc.), percentage
share of pension in AIMEmax; paid and total insurance period, and percentages of rewards and
penalties.
The Slovenian Tax O¢ ce (TORS) provided information on personal incomes retrieved from
personal income tax returns. For each person with personal income exceeding the minimum
taxable lower limit this dataset contain, inter alia, information on labor income (gross wage,
annual bonus, other job related perks), severance payment, capital income (dividends, rents)
and income from land ownership. In the empirical modeling of retirement decisions, we used
data on all these types of labor and capital income for the period 1994-2004.
The last source of data is Slovenian Statistical O¢ ce (SORS). From the Statistical Reg-
istry of Labor Force, maintained by SORS, we draw information on personal characteristics
of employees, such as birth year, gender, educational attainment and employment status for
the period 1994-2004. SORS also irregularly performs surveys of real estate ownership. In the
empirical analysis, we use the data from the 2002 wave. Finally, SORS also calculates the mor-
tality tables for Slovenian men and women. In calculations we use the average survival rates
7for each age based on the data for the period 2000-2002.
The sample
The sample of persons used in empirical analysis is reduced signi￿cantly relative to the original
data set for several reasons. First, we impose age restrictions consistent with statutory eligibility
conditions for both men (58-70 years) and women (53 or more to 65). Since many persons retired
before reaching these age limits, the sample does not capture all persons that retired or were
entitled to retire. However, by imposing the lower age limits of normal eligibility rules, we avoid
making arbitrary assumptions in calculation of pensions of persons that could retire under
special eligibility rules and special retirement laws. The sample that complies with these age
restrictions consists of 49,847 men (121,341 person-years) and 62,596 women (157,396 person
years) (see Table 1).
Second, we restrict the sample to full-time employees. While this reduction of sample may
introduce a bias in the estimated regression coe¢ cients, especially for forward looking variables
(i.e. social security wealth, option value, accrual, peak value), we make this assumption due
to missing information on personal characteristics and labor income of unemployed and self-
employed persons.9 The sample of persons that comply with these two conditions is reduced to
23,749 men (69,896 person-years) and 36,128 women (105,466 person years).
Third, we reduce the sample due to missing information on employment and earnings histo-
ries of persons. This information is necessary for calculation of pensions (and hence the forward
looking variables) of persons facing retirement decision in di⁄erent time periods. In order to
surmount this problem,10 we use information on pensions and conditions under which persons
retired to calculate the pensions that these persons would have received had they decided to
retire earlier. Since we only have access to RIIF data on newly retired persons in the period
1997-2005, we omit all observations for persons that retired after 2005. This sample reduction
may lead to biased estimates of response of retirement probability to variables based on calcu-
lated pensions, such as social security wealth, accrual, peak value, and option value to work.11
In order to minimize this bias, while retaining as much information from the data as possible,
we limit the estimation period to 1997-2003. The following reasons lead us to believe that this
bias is not large: (i) the sample consists of persons that retired immediately after they ful￿lled
9The information on personal characteristics of persons is available in Statistical Registry of Employed persons.
10This problem is magni￿ed by the fact that wage dispersion increased during the period 1987-1993 and
decreased the correlations between current labor income and pension entitlements (see Vodopivec and Orazem,
1995, 1997).
11The direction of bias is not clear as persons with higher option values could exhibit above or below average
propensities to retirement. If the propensity to retire is disproportionately greater for persons with higher option
value, then the regression coe¢ cient is downward biased and vice versa.
8the eligibility conditions, and those that carried on working long afterwards;12 (ii) for the pe-
riod used in estimations (1997-2003) more than 90 percent of persons retire within 4 years after
ful￿llment of eligibility conditions; and (iii) similarity of personal characteristics of individuals
from the sample for the periods 1997-1999 and 2000-2003.
Fourth, in order to avoid additional biases in estimates, we limit our sample to persons
that retired to receive an old-age pension. The persons who retired with disability pension are
omitted from the analysis since we do not have any information on the health status of persons.
Similarly, we exclude persons that received family pensions due to omitted information on
the composition of households. Also, we drop observations of persons in riskier jobs13 and
observations of persons that retired under special laws that allowed them to retire at lower
age14.
Finally, we eliminated observations that did not comply with minimum eligibility rules
regarding paid insurance periods and ￿nally, we eliminated the observations for which we observe
extraordinary dynamics in replacement ratios over time. Since information on working hours
is often unreliable, we did not calculate annual income from hourly wages, but instead used
annual wages reported in tax ￿lings. For some persons the replacement ratios (ratio between
pension and net wage) were unrealistically high (higher than 3) due to too low estimates of
annual labor income. Thus, the ￿nal sample consists of data for 1,043 men (7,555 person-years)
and 2,054 women (13,391 person-years).
Table 1: Number of Persons Facing Retirement Decision, 1997-2003
Men Women
Sample Persons Person-years Persons Person-years
All persons 49,847 121,341 62,596 157,396
Employed 23,749 69,896 36,128 105,466
Employed, old-age retired until 2005 17,133 40,062 25,590 58,021
Employed, old-age retired, no concessions 11,094 28,990 19,951 43,744
Employed, old-age retired, no conc., eligible 2,102 9,728 3,594 16,376
Employed, old-age retired, no conc., eligible, add con. 1,043 7,555 2,054 13,391
Source: TORS, SORS and own calculations.
Notes: Table reports the numbers of persons and person-years for di⁄erent samples of indidivuals facing
retirement decision.
12Nevertheless those with higher option values might be under-represented.
13E.g. police, army o¢ cers, members of parliament, etc.
14E.g. technologically obsolete workers, workers that were exposed to asbestos, persons that are entitled to
state pensions.
9Basic descriptive statistics
This subsection gives a brief overview of summary statistics used in empirical modeling of
retirement decisions of Slovenian men and women. Table 2 documents the hazard rates of
retirement in the period 1997-2003 for our sample and entire populations of men and women
in the same age cohorts. Both population and sample hazard rates were relatively high in
comparison to other countries. For the entire population of men and women, the hazard rates
of retirement were 30.3 and 28.3 percent, respectively.15 On one hand high hazard rates are a
consequence of higher age restriction for men (58 instead of 55 in other studies), and on the
other hand due to generally higher hazard rates in Slovenia. For the sample of persons used
in estimations containing only those persons that were entitled to retire with old-age pension,
the hazard rates of retirement were even higher, 69.7 and 75.1 percent for men and women,
respectively. These di⁄erences suggest that the population of workers contained those that
were forced to continue working. Declining hazard rates for women re￿ ect the e⁄ect of the 1999
pension reform, which increased the statutory age limits for women.
Table 2: Hazard Rates of Retirement: Population vs. Sample, 1997-2003
Sample Population
Year Men Women Men Women
1997 0.644 0.779 0.303 0.283
1998 0.688 0.770 0.335 0.303
1999 0.735 0.816 0.325 0.313
2000 0.662 0.770 0.306 0.300
2001 0.692 0.762 0.302 0.315
2002 0.736 0.683 0.301 0.277
2003 0.725 0.675 0.262 0.221
Average 0.694 0.751 0.305 0.287
Source: TORS, SORS and own calculations.
Further, Table 3 shows the hazard rates of retirement in our sample in relation to age of
persons. In line with evidence for the U.S. (Rust and Phelan, 1997; Coile and Gruber, 2001)
and Germany (Berkel and Borsch-Supan, 2004), we observe the spikes at statutory age limits
for normal old-age retirement. However, in contrast to the U.S. data where the hazard rates
of retirement tend to increase with age, we ￿nd the opposite pattern in Slovenia. In fact, the
probability of retirement of eligible men and women of age 58 and 53 years, respectively, is
almost 95 percent, as opposed to around 77 percent for men and women of age 61 and 56,
respectively. To conclude, these patterns of retirement already indicate rather weak incentives
15The average hazard rate of retirement for employed U.S. men was 5.7 percent in the period 1980-1991 (Coile
and Gruber, 2001).
10to work in Slovenia.
Table 3: Sample distribution and hazard rates (by age and gender), 1997-2003
Men Women
Age Number of persons Hazard rate Age Number of persons Hazard rate
58 1,325 0.949 53 2,784 0.948
59 1,128 0.904 54 2,906 0.913
60 1,225 0.855 55 1,984 0.852
61 877 0.779 56 1,243 0.767
62 582 0.729 57 853 0.720
63 1,147 0.476 58 1,302 0.566
64 521 0.276 59 921 0.439
65 325 0.197 60 553 0.398
66 196 0.224 61 342 0.383
67 117 0.145 62 204 0.314
68 64 0.219 63 144 0.354
69 32 0.125 64 90 0.300
70 16 0.500 65 64 0.391
Source: DURS, SURS and own calculations.
Next, we provide descriptive statistics for the set of variables used as explanatory variables in
modeling retirement decisions. In the top panel of Table 4 we show the averages of age of persons,
total insurance period and the number of years spent in formal education. The average age of
men and women in our sample is 61.1 and 55.8 years, respectively. Due to ongoing changes in the
pension system, the average age increased over time, although this pattern is less pronounced
in our sample as the key change a⁄ected the statutory rules regarding early retirement. The
average total insurance period is 38.7 years for men and 34.8 years for women. The average
total incurance period increased for women by 0.6 years, while it remained unchanged for men,
which is consistent with changes in normal statutory conditions for women. The average time
spent in formal education (Years of schooling) was 12.6 and 11.9 years for men and women,
respectively, with modest changes over time.
The upper middle panel of Table 4 compares the actual average annual net wage to the
average annual net pension that a person would have have received had she or he decided to
retire in a given year. These variables are expressed in constant prices using the Consumer Price
Index with the base year in 2003. Note that the annual net wage includes the annual bonus
and summer holiday pay, as these may represent a signi￿cant part of annual net compensation
of employees in Slovenia, while the pensions also the additional transfers paid by the RIIF.
Before we discuss the statistics based on calculated pensions, it is important to emphasize
that our indirect method of estimation of pensions for the periods prior actual retirement may
lead to biased values of both pensions and forward looking variables that use these pensions in
11empirical modeling. We estimate the pension for each person by combining the actual pensions
paid in the year of retirement, the formula that relates the pension to AIMEmax (see eq. 2)
and the rules for pension determination.16 The bias is a result of an implicit assumption of a
constant value of AIMEmax in all periods that a person faced retirement decision. The size
and direction of the bias depend on the time di⁄erence between the actual retirement date and
the date when a person faced a retirement decision and the direction of the bias di⁄ers between
di⁄erent groups of persons. In general we identify two types of biases. The ￿rst type of bias
is related to an increase in the wage inequality in late 1980s and early 1990s (see Orazem and
Vodopivec, 1995; 1997), which led to an increase in wages of high-skilled workers. For these
workers the AIMEmax increases over time, which implies that assuming constant AIMEmax
introduces upward biased estimates of pensions. This bias is less relevant for the majority of
low-skilled workers, since their AIMEmax is typically calculated from more distant periods,
before an increase in the wage inequality. The second type of bias is related to an extension of
the length of period (n) for calculation of AIMEmax after the 1999 reform. This bias is negative
for all workers, which implies that the calculated pensions in the periods prior actual retirement
are downward biased for low skilled workers and the net e⁄ect for high-skilled workers may be
either positive or negative. However, since wage premia increased signi￿cantly and variation
of time periods is modest (n is less or equal to 36 months), we believe that the bias for high-
skilled workers is positive. While we can not eliminate these biases, we keep this in mind in the
discussion of empirical results.
The average annual net wage (inclusive of bene￿ts) was 14,735 euros for men and 11,744
euros for women, wheras the average pension (inclusive of transfers), was 10,350 for men and
8,460 for women. The average real net wage increased over time for both men and women,
while the average calculated pension decreased for men and increased for women. The average
replacement ratio, de￿ned as a ratio between the pension that a person would have received if
she or he retired in a given period and net wage, is 0.794 for men and 0.764 for women. These
ratios are relatively high, which suggest that for the majority of workers incentives to work that
stem from the expected future wages may not be large. In fact, the average replacement ratios
decline with age for both men and women (see Table 9 in Appendix), which is consistent with
higher hazard rates for younger workers (Table 3).
The lower middle panel of Table 4 provides the average shares of persons with land and
16For person i that retired in period t and received pension Pit; the pension in period t ￿ k is:
Pit￿k = Pit
sit￿k ￿ (1 + xit￿k) ￿ vit￿k
sit ￿ (1 + xit) ￿ vit
:
Here we implicitly assumed that AIMEmax takes the same value in di⁄erent periods.
12apartment ownership and average shares and capital incomes from stock and apartment own-
ership. For measures of wealth we use indicator variables for land and housing ownership. The
shares of men and women (person-years) with land ownership were 64.6 and 52.9 percent17,
whereas 85.3 and 92.9 percent of men and women claimed ownership of at least one appartment
in a 2002 real-estate ownership survey.18 The shares of men and women who reported to have
received rents for letting appartments were 4.0 and 3.5 percent, respectively, with corresponding
average gross income from rents (at constant 2003 prices) around 4,083 and 3,344 euros. Over
time the average share of persons receiving rents increased, while the average amount of rent ex-
hibits no trend variation. 19 The give-away privatization of ￿rms also resulted in relatively high
shares of persons receiving dividend income. On average these shares were 35.3 and 33.5 per-
cent, with average income around 1,050 and 540 euros for men and women, respectively.20 Over
time these shares and dividend income were declining, pointing to consolidation of ownership
that took place in Slovenia.21
The statistics in the bottom panel of Table 4 show that as many as 38.1 and 48.7 percent of
newly retired men and women received severance payments. The average severance payments
were 4,683 and 2,592 euros for men and women, respectively. Over time the shares of newly
retired that received the severance pay decreased, while the average amounts increased.22
Descriptive statistics on forward looking variables
In a seminal paper Stock and Wise (1990) suggested to model the retirement decision as a
complex ￿nancial decision. Unlike preceding studies (e.g. Fields and Mitchell, 1984; Hausman
and Wise, 1985), which analyzed the e⁄ects of Social Security on retirement decisions, they
proposed to relate this decision to the real option value of work, which re￿ ects the combined
incentives of the Social Security and labor market performance. Taking their approach as a
departure point, Coile and Gruber (2001), proposed a decomposition of option value to work
17The personal tax ￿lings contain information on imputed land income. Since these values do not correspond
to market prices or rents, we only use indicator variable for land ownership.
18Due to give-away privatization of apartments in the early 1990s, the share of privately owned appartments
in Slovenia is among the highest in the world.
19Due to high tax rates on personal income tax, these ￿gures are likely to be biased downward.
20The share of individuals that own shares is also high due to give-away privatization of state-owned ￿rms and
employee buy-outs at discounted prices in the mid 1990s.
21Gregoric, Polanec and Slapnicar (2008) report that the value of Her￿ndahl index for ownership concentration
(HH5) between 1999 and 2004 increased from 0.199 to 0.344.
22We examined the patterns of variation of severance payments over time, sector, age and insurance period of
newly retired persons. There is signi￿cant heterogeneity in terms of shares and average amount over time and
across sectors. The public sector employees were more likely to receive severance payments than employees in
other private sectors. Controlling for the sector of employment, we observe that the share of newly retired that
were entitled to severance payments declined over time. We also ￿nd that average share of persons that received
severance payment declined over time. However, we do not observe systematic variation of average share and
amount for persons retiring at di⁄erent age and with di⁄erent total insurance period.
13Table 4: Summary Statistics for the Sample, 1997-2003
Men Women
Period 1997-99 2000-03 All years 1997-99 2000-03 All years
Age (years) 61.0 61.2 61.1 55.7 55.9 55.8
(2.7) (2.4) (2.5) (2.6) (2.7) (2.7)
Total insurance period (years) 38.7 38.7 38.7 34.5 35.1 34.8
(3.3) (3.6) (3.4) (3.0) (2.6) (2.8)
Years of schooling 12.7 12.4 12.6 11.8 12.0 11.9
(4.0) (3.6) (3.8) (3.3) (3.1) (3.2)
Annual net wage and bene￿ts (euros) 14,604 14,842 14,735 11,335 12,148 11,744
(9,059) (10,649) (9,963) (6,390) (6,881) (6,654)
Annual pension and transfers (euros) 10,519 10,211 10,350 8,261 8,657 8,460
(4,388) (4,296) (4,340) (3,465) (3,583) (3,530)
Replacement ratio 0.795 0.793 0.794 0.769 0.759 0.764
(0.156) (0.168) (0.163) (0.153) (0.175) (0.165)
Land income (share) 0.661 0.634 0.646 0.525 0.533 0.529
(0.474) (0.482) (0.478) (0.499) (0.499) (0.499)
Apartment ownership in 2002 (share) 0.853 0.854 0.853 0.925 0.924 0.924
(0.354) (0.353) (0.354) (0.263) (0.266) (0.264)
Ap. rent income (share) 0.032 0.047 0.040 0.029 0.041 0.035
(0.176) (0.212) (0.197) (0.169) (0.197) (0.184)
Ap. rent income (euros) 5,800 3,117 4,083 3,943 2,916 3,344
(15,233) (5,890) (10,337) (6,598) (6,347) (6,465)
Dividend income (share) 0.406 0.361 0.381 0.396 0.338 0.367
(0.491) (0.480) (0.486) (0.489) (0.473) (0.482)
Dividend income (euros) 913 1,177 1,050 634 433 540
(3,310) (6,264) (5,063) (4,085) (2,358) (3,395)
Severance pay (share of newly) retired 0.375 0.386 0.381 0.496 0.477 0.487
(0.484) (0.487) (0.486) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500)
Severance pay (euros) 4,387 4,916 4,683 2,713 2,459 2,592
(9,235) (13,866) (11,974) (5,153) (7,389) (6,397)
Source: TORS, SORS and own calculations.
Notes: Standard deviations are given in parentheses.
into two parts: a part that re￿ ects the Social Security incentives and a part that re￿ ects
the stream of future net wages. In empirical modeling of retirement decisions, we follow the
empirical strategy of Coile and Gruber (2001) and use as explanatory variables the forward
looking variables for which we document here the distributional moments.23
We ￿rst consider the distributional features of social security wealth, de￿ned as the expected
present value of receipts from the social security system. We calculate SSW for each person
and each retirement year as a stream of future bene￿ts to which a person is entitled, based on
his or her working to the beginning of age X and assuming a constant 3 percent real annual
23Note that since we do not have information on marital status of persons not information on identity of
spouses, we calculate all these variables independently of their marital status.
14discount rate and age and gender speci￿c survival probabilities for the period 2000-2002.24 The
real pensions and other bene￿ts are assumed to grow at actual growth rates until 2005, and at 2
percent per annum afterwards. The pensions are also adjusted by valorization coe¢ cients used
to reduce the pensions of newly retired persons.
In Table 5 we show the moments of distributions of SSW by age and gender for our sample
of persons. The age pro￿le of SSW re￿ ects an interplay of three factors: i) deferred retire-
ment decreases SSW due to shorter remaining life span of workers, ii) postponed retirement
increases the pension due to higher share s of AIMEmax and bonuses x (see equation (2)) and
iii) composition of workers changes in favor of persons with higher wages and higher pensions.
We ￿nd that at lower age the latter two e⁄ects dominate the ￿rst e⁄ect, while the opposite is
true for older persons. Such pattern is not observed only in Slovenia, but also in other countries
(e.g. Coile and Gruber, 2001, for the U.S.). Note also that the pattern of SSW is not globally
concave due to composition e⁄ect at the age limits for eligibility of the second set of statutory
rules for retirement. Namely, at the age 63 for men and 58 for women we observe a decline in
the values of SSW for all quantiles due to greater share of less-skilled workers.
Table 5: Social Security Wealth Distribution (by age and gender), 1997-2003
Men Women
Age 10th Median 90th Std Dev Age 10th Median 90th Std Dev
58 97,339 130,483 225,215 57,347 53 120,693 130,483 222,074 57,347
59 99,345 138,627 278,683 67,208 54 125,200 138,627 255,334 67,208
60 97,635 143,239 276,925 68,576 55 138,089 143,239 276,317 68,576
61 94,235 158,469 277,205 71,764 56 139,489 158,469 309,339 71,764
62 96,893 175,775 272,933 69,076 57 145,994 175,775 344,263 69,076
63 55,271 125,795 231,416 64,615 58 81,041 125,795 335,554 64,615
64 94,532 163,142 238,053 57,423 59 80,906 163,142 346,066 57,423
65 102,697 177,061 240,248 53,822 60 91,921 177,061 347,419 53,822
66 107,865 180,297 231,699 48,602 61 87,080 180,297 337,571 48,602
67 94,107 161,442 211,282 47,386 62 85,457 161,442 331,029 47,386
68 91,833 150,866 203,345 44,655 63 81,513 150,866 323,257 44,655
69 71,013 137,114 208,775 50,407 64 77,582 137,114 323,567 50,407
70 85,822 158,760 205,176 50,530 65 79,893 158,760 316,898 50,530
Source: TORS, SORS and own calculations.
Notes: Social security wealth (SSW) is calculated as expected present value of pensions and other transfers
from the Public Pension Fund. SSW is calculated in constant (2003) prices.
24We calculate the social security wealth as a discounted sum of pensions (inclusive of other transfers paid by
the government to retired persons) that a person retiring at the beginning of period t would receive in subsequent
periods. This sum is discounted using ￿ as a discount factor and weighted by the probabilities of survival
(Pr[Sur = 1]) between retirement age and all remaining ages: The SSW for person i of age x in period t is
calculated as:
SSWit =
X
j
Pr[Surx+j = 1] ￿
j Pit+j:
15One of the measures often used to present the incentives in the Social Security is accrual.
This measure is calculated as the change in the SSW between two subsequent periods. Hence,
positive values of accrual imply that the Social Security rewards postponed retirement and vice
versa. Table 6 shows the quantiles of distributions for accrual. The median values of accrual are
negative for most ages and the values of accrual of 90th percentile are positive, but relatively
low. This is the ￿rst indication of weak incentives for work in the Social Security in Slovenia.25
Table 6: Accrual Distribution (by age and gender), 1997-2003
Men Women
Age 10th Median 90th Std Dev Age 10th Median 90th Std Dev
58 -37 32 403 307 53 -421 -189 -95 140
59 -84 3 40 166 54 -485 -213 91 221
60 -192 -43 183 267 55 -536 -248 -47 256
61 -196 -13 196 265 56 -568 -246 125 317
62 -967 -318 -3 550 57 -1,274 -351 100 624
63 -210 147 420 264 58 -494 -121 365 465
64 -312 -27 611 355 59 -616 -214 65 353
65 -315 -160 837 488 60 -652 -265 50 369
66 -1,910 -477 -181 734 61 -698 -296 21 431
67 -466 -237 -47 192 62 -688 -338 -3 456
68 -426 -246 -63 136 63 -688 251 693 526
69 -403 -261 -18 205 64 -713 -48 565 520
Source: TORS, SORS and own calculations.
Notes: Accrual is calculated as the di⁄erence between the expected present value of
pensions and other transfers and current present value of pensions and other transfers.
Accrual is given in constant (2003) prices.
In Table 7 we report the option value to work (OV ). This is a summary measure that re￿ ects
the combined e⁄ect of incentives in the social security system and labor market performance.26
The option values are positive for the majority of men and women of all ages and continued
work increased the expected present value of future labor and pension income. However, for the
majority of persons in each period, the values of option values are relatively low (less than annual
25A similar conclusion can be drawn based on the quantiles of distributions of peak values (table for peak
values is omitted for brevity). Peak value is de￿ned as the di⁄erence between the maximum expected SSW (over
di⁄erent periods of retirement) and the expected SSW of immediate retirement. Since SSW declines with age for
the majority of workers, the peak value is highly correlated with accrual (the correlation coe¢ cients reported in
Table 10 in Appendix are 0.87 and 0.90 for men and women, respectively).
26Option value is de￿ned as the di⁄erence between the maximum expected present value of income and pensions
and Social Security Wealth if a person decides to retire immediately:
OVt = max
ret_year=j
fPVt+jg ￿ SSWt; (3)
PVt+j =
ret_year￿1 X
j=0
Pr[Surt+j = 1]￿
jW
net
t+j +
Jmax X
ret_year
Pr[Surt+j = 1]￿
jP
net
t+j:
16labor income). Moreover, given low or even negative values of accruals, this ￿nding implies that
incentives for continued work are provided only from the expected di⁄erence between future
wages and pensions.
Table 7: Option Value Distribution (by age and gender), 1997-2003
Men Women
Age 10th Median 90th Std Dev Age 10th Median 90th Std Dev
58 -874 2,572 12,761 19,021 53 -2,743 51 5,841 9,303
59 -865 3,054 18,814 28,545 54 -2,774 388 8,025 10,437
60 -834 3,155 28,974 26,935 55 -2,315 2,592 14,423 14,705
61 -990 3,868 40,525 40,519 56 -2,187 3,074 15,430 17,845
62 -2,059 5,808 54,998 43,290 57 -3,694 2,735 16,278 20,726
63 1,373 10,271 37,380 21,596 58 -458 6,326 23,643 22,331
64 1,864 12,566 40,363 20,876 59 -1,026 5,065 25,475 27,345
65 925 11,128 36,920 23,175 60 -628 6,917 31,934 32,557
66 -6,255 8,168 39,121 23,532 61 -283 7,830 35,039 36,675
67 896 10,732 43,417 22,657 62 84 9,344 36,801 27,188
68 631 10,180 43,706 21,339 63 1,340 11,873 39,715 32,345
69 -306 12,372 46,555 18,324 64 -771 7,563 28,963 22,816
70 -602 16,463 38,242 17,015 65 -3,443 5,725 24,199 17,232
Source: TORS, SORS and own calculations.
Notes: Option value is calculated as the di⁄erence between the maximum expected present discounted value
of net wages and the expected present value of social security bene￿ts from immediate retirement.
Option value is given in constant (2003) prices.
4 Empirical estimations
Econometric model
As already noted above, we estimate a modi￿ed version of empirical model for retirement
decision proposed by Coile and Gruber (2001):
Pr[Rit = 1jRit￿1 = 0] = ￿0 + ￿1OVit + ￿2SSWit + ￿3NWit +
X
e
￿4;eDiet + (4)
+
X
k
￿5;kxikt + ￿6Sijt +
X
j
￿7;jDijt +
X
s
￿8;sDist:
Here Rit denotes a binary variable that assumes value 1 if person i decides to retire in period t
and 0 if she decides to continue to work and postpone retirement to the future. SSW is the value
of social security wealth, OV is the real option value of continuation of work and NW is the net
wage inclusive of other employment-related income. De denote dummies for di⁄erent levels of
education. xks denote variables that measure personal wealth and income derived from assets.
17As described above, we use dummy variables for land and housing ownership, in addition to
continuous variables that measure income from stock ownership (dividends) and rental income
from letting the apartments. In addition to these variables, we also include severance payments
and NACE 1-digit sector (Dj) and year (Ds) dummies. Finally, although variables that measure
health status of persons may in￿ uence retirement decision, such data are not readily available
and thus not part of our econometric model.
Results
In line with previous empirical work, we analyze retirement decisions of men and women sepa-
rately. Berkel and Borsch-Supan (2004) found weaker responsiveness to option value of work for
women. Contrary to German data, we ￿nd positive (negative) correlation coe¢ cient between
accrual and peak value on one hand and retirement dummy on the other hand for men (women),
which suggests that women respond to the Social Security incentives to a greater extent (see
Table 10 in Appendix).
We report the estimates of coe¢ cients for the retirement probability model in Table 8.27
In order to gauge the relative importance of incentives inherent in the social security system
and labor market performance, we include variables sequentially while controlling for a set of
variables that may also a⁄ect retirement decision, such as educational attainment, measures of
wealth, capital income, severance payment, and year and industry dummies. In columns (1)
and (4) we focus on the responsiveness of retirement to option value to work. Given negative
correlation coe¢ cients between retirement dummy and OV for both men and women, it is
not suprising that we ￿nd that higher OV decreases the probability of retirement. Somewhat
surprisingly we ￿nd greater response of retirement to OV for women than for men. Namely, the
marginal e⁄ect of an increase in OV by 1,000 euros decreases the probability of retirement for
men and women with average characteristics by 0.315 and 0.565 percentage points, respectively,
which suggest that Slovenian men and women respond to ￿nancial incentives.28
In Table 6 we have shown that an additional year of work alone does not increase the social
security wealth for the majority of persons. High correlation coe¢ cients between accruals and
peak values imply that a large part of variation in OV stems from di⁄erences between expected
stream of wages and pensions rather than the incentives in the social security system. In order
to test this hypothesis, we extend the model to include the social security wealth in columns (2)
27This choice implies an implicit assumption of a normally distributed error term.
28It is important to note that the average option value to work for men is considerably higher than corresponding
value for women: 13,372 euros for men as opposed to only 6,089 euros for women. This implies that an increase
in OV by 1,000 euros corresponds to lower relative change of option value for men: it amounts to 7.47 percent for
men and 16.42 percent for women, respectively. Hence the elasticities of retirement probability to option value
is -0.57 for men and -0.44 for women.
18and (5) and both the social security wealth and the net wage in columns (3) and (6). Looking
at the latter set of results we ￿nd that OV , purged of e⁄ects of net wage, plays a much lesser
roler than suggested by columns (1) and (4). In fact, the coe¢ cient for men is not statistically
signi￿cant, while for women it is much closer to zero. This di⁄erence between men and women
is not surprising as there is a positive correlation between accrual (peak value) and probability
of retirement for men and negative for women (see Table 10 in Appendix). In this case, an
increase in OV by 1,000 euros would decrease the probability of retirement for women with
average characteristics by 0.272 percentage points. Hence, the responsiveness of Slovenian men
and women is lower than responsiveness found for U.S., Germany and many other countries
(Gruber and Wise, 2004).
The estimates in columns (3) and (6) also con￿rm previous studies (e.g. Coile and Gruber,
2001), which ￿nd that an increase in SSW reduces the probability of retirement. For our
sample we ￿nd that an increase in SSW by 10,000 euros leads to a reduction of the likelihood
of retirement by 2.01 and 0.55 percentage points for men and women, respectively. We also ￿nd
that higher net wages induce both men and women to continue working. However, the implied
marginal e⁄ects, evaluated at the average characteristics of persons, suggest that an increase
in the net annual wage by 1,000 euros reduces the likelihood of retirement by 1.99 and 1.70
percentage points for men and women, respectively. Based on these estimates, we can conclude
that Slovenian Social Security provides negligible incentives to work and that the key factor
that drove some workers to postpone retirement could be only the di⁄erence between wages and
pensions. Moreover, as suggested by Coile and Gruber (2001), if wage di⁄erences at least partly
re￿ ect di⁄erences in attitudes towards work between workers (disutility to work), the ￿nancial
incentives altogether, may play negligible role in explaining retirement decisions in Slovenia.
Next, we turn to the e⁄ects of other variables included in the estimations of equations in
columns (3) and (6). Note ￿rst that the likelihood of retirement is lower for persons with
higher educational attainment. This is suggested by negative and highly signi￿cant regression
coe¢ cients for dummy variables for men with high school and college degree (or higher) and
for women with completed college degree (or higher). The marginal e⁄ects of college degree
are large: the likelihood of retirement of men (women) with college degree is lower by 45
(21) percentage points than for men with primary school. These results can be explained by
di⁄erences in the relative value of leisure between di⁄erent workers, since disutility of work may
be greater for workers with lower educational attainment who are more likely to hold jobs that
are more physically and less mentally challenging. On the other hand, the stark signi￿cance
of the dummy variable for education can re￿ ect the bias in calculation of OV , where due to
19Table 8: Estimates of retirement probability model
Men Women
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OV -0.0948** -0.105** 0.0180 -0.195** -0.190** -0.0944**
(0.0087) (0.0090) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.014)
SSW 0.187** 0.611** -0.140** 0.191**
(0.035) (0.049) (0.022) (0.041)
NW -0.604** -0.593**
(0.048) (0.062)
High school -0.262** -0.342** -0.337** -0.0361 0.0324 0.0381
(0.066) (0.068) (0.069) (0.040) (0.042) (0.042)
College or more -1.336** -1.519** -1.396** -0.927** -0.772** -0.697**
(0.065) (0.074) (0.075) (0.040) (0.047) (0.048)
Land ownership 0.172** 0.154** 0.154** 0.0558* 0.0657* 0.0643*
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Appartment ownership 0.102* 0.0994* 0.0793 0.145** 0.145** 0.138**
(0.049) (0.049) (0.050) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049)
Dividends 0.0107 -0.0155 0.0510 0.0786 0.163 0.212*
(0.054) (0.056) (0.055) (0.096) (0.094) (0.095)
Rents 0.0384 0.0369 0.0115 -0.149* -0.151* -0.145
(0.073) (0.074) (0.070) (0.085) (0.085) (0.085)
Severance pay 0.0457* 0.0340 0.0518** 0.138** 0.166** 0.217**
(0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Constant 1.245** 1.106** 1.296** 0.717** 0.875** 0.965**
(0.087) (0.090) (0.093) (0.066) (0.072) (0.072)
N 7115 7115 7115 13001 13001 13001
Industry and year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log-likelihood -3550 -3535 -3459 -6071 -6051 -6005
Chi-2 1686 1716 1868 2175 2215 2307
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Source: TORS, SORS and own calculations.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ** and * denote statistical signi￿cance at 1 and 5 percent.
OV and net wage are given in 10,000 euros and SSW is given in 100,000 euros.
short pay history OV is underestimated for highly educated workers and overestimated for low
skilled workers. Another possible explanation for lower likelihood of retirement of persons with
higher education is the possible correlation between individual health and education, or that
one￿ s health is one of the key determinants of retirement behaviour where individuals of poor
health retire earlier (Piekkola 2004). The di⁄erences in size of the regression coe¢ cient between
males and females may also be a consequence of higher compresion of wages for females, which
may lead to smaller di⁄erences between estimated and actual OV for females with higher
educational attainment.
Looking at the dummy variables for land ownership and appartment ownership we see that
all the coe¢ cients are positive and signi￿cant, with the exception of regression coe¢ cient for
20apartment ownership for males. Thus, persons with ownership of land and apartment retire
sooner compared to persons without this form of tangible wealth.
On the other hand dividend income and rents are not signi￿cant for males, whereas for
females both coe¢ cients are signi￿cant. The regression coe¢ cient for females is positive as
expected, while the coe¢ cient for rents is negative, which may be attributed to tax optimisation,
i.e., if a couple lets a house or appartment it is cost e⁄ective that the lower earning spouse
declares rent income, which is in most cases a female. As expected severance pay is positive
and signi￿cant for both females and males, which suggests that persons with employers willing
to pay severance payment retired earlier.
5 Conclusions
Pension systems in virtually all EU countries are changing due to increased ￿nancial burden
brougth about by aging populations. When faced with the task of reforming the pension system,
countries typically respond by increasing the statutory limit to retire, abolishing early retirement
incentives and introducing the marginal incentives to postopne retirement. The key question
to address is, however, which of these measures will be the most e⁄ective in increasing the
labor force participation or alternatively stated which factors are crucial in determining pension
behaviour of individuals.
Although several studies tried to tackle this issue, to the best of our knowledge no study ex-
ists for one of the transition countries. This is especially important due to important di⁄erences
in labor market conditions between transition and established market economies. This paper
￿lls this gap by relating the retirement decisions of Slovenian men and women to traditional
forward looking variables (option value to work, social security wealth), current variables such
as net wage and variables that proxy personal wealth, di⁄erent types of capital income and
severance payments.
Our analysis shows that although signi￿cant (with exception of OV for males), incentives
inherent in the Social Security have a relatively week e⁄ect on probability of retirement. On the
other hand, changes in net wage have an order of magnitude higher e⁄ect on the probability of
retirement. This is a consequence of two factors. Firstly, due to high compression of pensions
most of volatility in option value is due to wages. Secondly, delaying retirement for one year
decreases the social security wealth for the majority of persons included in the sample. It is
therefore not surprising that among the possible policy measures such as increasing/decreasing
the ￿nancial incentives in the pension system have a relatively weak e⁄ect on the labor force
participation (Polanec and Ah￿ can, 2007). For this reason we believe that the only e⁄ective
21policy aimed at increasing the e⁄ective retirement age is increasing the statutory retirement
age.
Among the set of other variables educational attainment has the strongest e⁄ect on the
probability of retirement. Men (women) holding a college degree are 45 (21) percentage points
less likely to retire when compared to their primary school educated counterparts. On the other
hand, land ownership positively a⁄ects the probability of retirement. Appartment ownership
has a similar e⁄ect although the impact on the probability of retirement is only signi￿cant for
females. The same result is obtained for dividends which seem to positively a⁄ect the probability
of retirement only in the case of females. Rents on the other hand are not signi￿cant, whereas
severance payment has a positive and statistically signi￿cant e⁄ect on likelihood of retirement.
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Appendix
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the e⁄ects of the 1992 and 1999 pension reforms for men and
women. The cumulative shares of retired persons relative to the total number of persons in
a given age cohort declined between 1997 and 2004. In the period betwen 1997 and 2000 the
decline was mainly caused by reduction of early retirement policies (re￿ ected in lower retirement
shares of persons below the statutory age for old-age pensions), whereas in the later period the
decline was caused by increases in the statutory retirement age.
Figure 1: Cumulative retirement shares for men in Slovenia, 1997-2004
24Figure 2: Cumulative retirement shares for women, 1997-2004
The relationship between the average replacement ratio and age for men and women is shown
in Table 9. It is evident that the average replacement ratio increases with age.
Table 9: Average replacement ratio (by age and gender), 1997-2003
Men Women
Average Average
Age replacement ratio Age replacement ratio
58 0.908 53 0.853
59 0.847 54 0.799
60 0.811 55 0.740
61 0.772 56 0.717
62 0.755 57 0.725
63 0.718 58 0.718
64 0.723 59 0.698
65 0.706 60 0.691
66 0.719 61 0.697
67 0.698 62 0.698
68 0.703 63 0.710
69 0.679 64 0.731
70 0.741 65 0.759
Source: TORS, SORS and own calculations.
Table 10 reports the correlation coe¢ cients between the key variables used in empirical
modeling of retirement.
25Table 10: Correlation Coe¢ cients for the Sample, 1997-2003
Men
Variable Accrual SSW Peak OV Wage Ret
Accrual 1.00
SSW -0.20 1.00
Peak 0.87 -0.11 1.00
OV -0.07 0.43 0.03 1.00
Wage -0.19 0.77 -0.09 0.79 1.00
DRetired 0.15 -0.26 0.07 -0.28 -0.38 1.00
Women
Variable Accrual SSW Peak OV Wage Ret
Accrual 1.00
SSW -0.31 1.00
Peak 0.90 -0.29 1.00
OV 0.03 0.32 0.03 1.00
Wage -0.19 0.82 -0.14 0.67 1.00
DRetired -0.05 -0.27 -0.11 -0.25 -0.35 1.00
Source: TORS, SORS and own calculations.
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